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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
police power for the protection of the health and welfare of soci-
ety. In reaching such a balance, any reasonable doubt on the part
of the court or the jury as to the efficacy of the treatment and
prognosis, the urgency and necessity of such treatment, and the
resultant social and moral advancement, should be resolved
in favor of the parent's fredom of action. The area where courts
intervene should always be limited by extremely narrow bounds
which can only be extended as the science of medicine and
surgery becomes more definite and exact.
CRImINAL LAw-PoWER OF A COURT TO TRY A PERSON
BROUGHT INTO THE JURISDICTION ILLEGALLY
While residing in Illinois, petitioner was seized by Michigan
police, taken into Michigan, tried and convicted of a murder com-
mitted in Michigan. Extradition proceedings were not availed
of. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court, alleging that he had been brought into the
jurisdiction in violation of the Federal Anti-Kidnapping Statute.,
The petition was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
decision of the District Court was reversed and remanded. On
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held: re-
versed, and the decision of the District Court reinstated on the
ground that the power of a court to try and convict a person
accused of a crime is not impaired by the fact that he has been
forcibly brought into the jurisdiction.2
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States was
consistent with its own precedents. In Ker v. Illinois,3 where a
state official had forcibly brought the accused back from a
foreign country without having first requested the foreign coun-
try to return him, it was held that the state court had jurisdic-
tion to try and convict the accused. Later, in Mahon v. Justice, 4
the same court ruled that the forcible abduction of a person ac-
cused of a crime from a sister state by police officers of the prose-
cuting state did not render the conviction void. The rule of those
two cases has been consistently followed by both federal and
state tribunals in cases involving the trial of persons abducted
1. 62 STAT. 760 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1950).
2. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
3. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
4. 127 U.S. 700 (1888).
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from foreign countries 5 and sister states by officers of the prose-
cuting state or by private individuals7 This rule has been applied
regardless of the existence or non-existence of a request for the
accused's return,8 or the disposition of the request,9 and even
where the governor of the state from which the accused was
taken demanded his return." The reason given by the courts in
justification of their decisions has been that even though the
person or persons forcibly abducting the accused into another
state may be guilty of civil and criminal wrongs, the state's
jurisdiction to try a person accused of an offense against the
people should not be affected by the wrongful acts of individ-
uals."
The United States Supreme Court has rejected the argument
that due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is violated by the trial of a person who has been unlawfully
brought into the jurisdiction. The only due process required by
that court is that the accused be given a fair trial and accorded
all the other constitutional guarantees. 12 Except for two in-
stances,13 the courts have ruled similarly with regard to the due
process clauses of the state constitutions.- The Supreme Court
5. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); U.S. v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310
(N.D. Ill. 1934); Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934); U.S.
v. Unverzagt, 299 Fed. 1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924).
6. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S.
700 (1888) ; Ex parte Glenn, 103 Fed. 947 (C.C.D.W. Va. 1900).
7. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886); Ex parte Glenn, 103 Fed. 947 (C.C.D.W. Va. 1900); U.S. v. Insull,
8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1934); Leahy v. Kunkel, 4 F. Supp. 849 (N.D.
Ind. 1933) ; Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
8. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); Mahon v. Justice, 127
U.S. 700 (1888) Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Ex parte Glenn, 103
Fed. 947 (C.C.5.W. Va. 1900); U.S. v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill.
1934) ; Leahy v. Kunkel, 4 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Ind. 1933) ; Ex parte Lopez,
6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934); U.S. v. Unverzagt, 299 Fed. 1015 (W.D.
Wash. 1924).
9. Hall v. Johnston, 86 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1936).
10. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888).
11. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); Adams'v. New York, 192
U.S. 585 (1904); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888); Ker v. Illinois
119 U.S. 436 (1886) ; U.S. v. Baldi, 198 F.2d 113 (3rd Cir. 1952) ; Stamphill
v. Johnston, 136 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1943); Ex parte Glenn, 103 Fed. 947
(C.C.D.W. Va. 1900); Carey v. Brady, 39 F. Supp. 515 (D. Md. 1941);
U.S. v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1934).
12. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); Mahon v. Justice, 127
U.S. 700 (1888); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
13. State v. Simmons, 39 Kan. 262, 18 Pac. 177 (1888) ; In re Robinson,
29 Neb. 135,45 N.W. 267 (1890).
14. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888). For collection of state cases,
see Note, 165 A.L.R. 959 (1946).
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of Nebraska in an early decision upheld the granting of a writ
of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was forcibly abducted into
the state,'- but this decision was overruled in a subsequent case.10
In State v. Simmons17 the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld the
granting of a writ of habeas corpus under the same circum-
stances. That decision has never been overruled, 8 but a more
recent Kansas case referred favorably to the majority rule.19
Thus it is well settled that the courts of every jurisdiction of
this country, with the possible exception of Kansas, will not
grant a writ of habeas corpus to release a person convicted of a
crime because he has been forcibly abducted or kidnapped into
the jurisdiction.
EQUITY - TRADE NAME PROTECTION - CHARITABLE
CORPORATION'S RIGHTS AGAINST A BUSINESS
Plaintiff, the "Golden Slipper Square Club," a non-profit,
charitable corporation had presented annual stage shows and
dinners since 1924 at which contributions had been solicited in
order to finance its various charitable activities. Defendant,
a restaurant and night club, adopted the name "Golden Slipper
Restaurant and Catering Service, Inc." in 1948 with intent to
trade on plaintiff's good name. Plaintiff in the lower court ob-
tained an injunction restraining defendant from further use of
its name. On appeal, held: affirmed. A well-established chari-
table corporation is entitled to injunctive relief against a busi-
ness corporation adopting a similar name with the intent to
trade on the charity's good will and reputation."
It has been generally recognized that a trade name of a busi-
ness organization will be protected from infringement.2 At
15. In re Robinson, 29 Neb. 135, 45 N.W. 267 (1890).
16. Jackson v. Olson, 146 Neb. 885, 22 N.W.2d 124 (1946).
17. 39 Kan. 262, 18 Pac. 177 (1888).
18. Nor has the case been followed. The question has never since been
raised in Kansas.
19. State v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052 (1918).
1. Golden Slipper Square Club v. Golden Slipper Restaurant and Catering,
Inc., 371 Pa. 92, 88 A.2d 734 (1952).
2. A name which is primarily generic or descriptive cannot be appropri-
ated as a technical trade mark or trade name, but it will be afforded pro-
tection if it has, through usage, acquired a secondary meaning in the public
mind as associated with a certain party or corporation. Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Dunnell, 172 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1949); Weatherford v. Eytchison,
90 Cal. App. 2d 379, 202 P.2d 1040 (1949); see American Steel Foundries
v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926).
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